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Motivation
I scalable management
I mass configuration
I distributed honeypots for tracking cyber-predators
I announce specific-keywords on P2P file sharing system
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Research challenges
I scalability: open participation to honeypot
I efficiency: keywords changes → fast keywords updates
I tracking prevention: controller and honeypots
anonymity
I security: false keywords list updates
I reachability guarentees: knowing the impact of a
request is needed provide additional operations
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Malware communication paradigms
I attackers faced the same problems
I control multiple machines through the Internet
I goals: distributed denial of service attacks, mass collecting
of sensitive data
I construction of a botnet
I control mechanism to send orders to the bots and get the
responses
I decentralized and scalable: example of 400 000 zombies in
one botnet
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Botnet based network management
I use a botnet to perform management operations
I different types of botnet
I IRC model1
I P2P models : unstructered (Slapper) and structured
(Chord)
→ study of performances of these types of botnets once
they are deployed
1J. Francois, R. State, and O. Festor, ’Botnet based scalable network
management’, DSOM 2007
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Parameters
I N : total number of devices/peers
I m is the maximal branching factor = the maximal
number message sent by a peer at the same time
(message forwarding)
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Parameters
I a peer can crash if it has to maintain too many
connections → α(m) is the probability for a peer to
be able to forward the messages, decreasing function
I the risk to be compromised by an attacker and to be
attacked (network communication monitoring): β
11 / 29
Introduction Malware for management Models Results Conclusion
Goal: determine the reachability = the number of peers
reached at a certain distance
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Slapper model
I a sophisticated worm
I infected computers form a botnet
I full-meshed network
I controller tracking prevention: the message is transmitted
through several peers
I broadcast segmentation
I the initiator (the controller) sends the messages to m
random peers
I when a peer receives a message, it sends the messages to
m random peers
I a maximal number of hops is fixed
I original m = 2
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Slapper model
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Slapper model
I the same message can be sent to the same peers two
times
I no guarentee to reach all peers
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Chord model
I each peer has an id: 0 ≤ id < NMAX
I routing table of each node p:
I log(NMAX ) entries
I ith entry: first id at a distance from p at least 2i−1
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Chord model
I broadcast2:
I forward the messages to each peers of the routing table
I each peer has an exploration limit = min(the next peers in
the routing table of the message sender, sender exploration
limit)
2S. El-Ansary et-al, ’Efficient broadcast in structured p2p networks’ IPTPS 03
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Slapper
I N = 2000 peers I i varies from 1 to 14 hops
I maximal value = reach
all peers except
discovered peers
I → limited by β
(probability for each
node to be
compromised)
I higher branching factor → higher reachability
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Slapper
I N = 5000 peers I i varies from 1 to 14 hops
I compromised probability
β has a higher impact
when the number of
peers increases
I N increases → curves
increase less at the begin
and more at the end
I same number of hops to reach the maximal value
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Slapper
I number of hops = 8
I N varies from 100 to
5000
I curves converge to a fixed
limit depending on β and
N
I very bad performances for
m = 2 (not suitable)
I high distance → no impact of the branching factor
20 / 29
Introduction Malware for management Models Results Conclusion
Chord
I number of hops varies
from 1 to 13
I N = 5000 peers
I very close curve →
limited impact of the
average distance between
two node
I Slapper is about
equivalent until a certain
distance
I Chord → all the peers can be reached
I Chord has a better reachability
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Impact of attacks
I rat(n) =
#discovered peersSlapper
#discovered peersChord
I independant from the
distance d
I important benefit of
Chord
I ratio decreases at the
end
I ratio is still 20 for 2512 peers
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Chord
I number of hops = 6 I N varies from 1 to 216
I Slapper: limitation by
beta (best case)
I 6 hops = number of hops
to have a reachability
equivalent to Slapper
I increasing distance →
better results for Chord
I Slapper is better between 210 and 212 peers
I Chord can be better from 212 peers
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What to choose ?
IRC Slapper Chord
Efficiency
The lowest num-
ber of hops
The lowest delays
Resiliency
very constrained
(unavaibility, at-
tacks)
very constrained
by attacks, few
connections
high resiliency,
few connections,
partial view
Scalability #devices < 212 #devices ≥ 212
Security
The manager
can be tracked
Tracking the manager is very dif-
ficult (the intermediary nodes)
Interest
Large and closed
networks + cen-
tral authority
Large networks
of checked part-
ners (research
distributed
honeypot)
Huge and public
networks (honey-
pot where every-
one can partici-
pate)
Table: Comparison of the different frameworks 25 / 29
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Questions ?
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Slapper model
I assumptions:
I reachi−1 total number of reached peers at a maximal
distance i − 1
I p(t, c , j): probability to contact j not yet reached peers
from already contacted c peers and with c messages to
sent
I maximal number of messages sent at the ith hop :
I 1st hop: m, 2nd hop: m ×m→ mi
I limited by avability factor: msg = (m × α(m))i
I maximum number of new reached peers at the ith
hop: max = min((m × α(m))i ,N − reachi−1)
I average number of reached peers at an exact distance
of i =
∑max
k=0 p(reachi−1,msg , k)× k
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Chord model
I compute the number of hops to reach a peer p from
the peer 0
I p = 2k → single hop
I p − d < 2k → no peers between p and 2k → single hop
I else there is an intermediary peer →, do the same process
from this peer
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Deployment
Evaluation → help an administrator to choose the right
topology and to know the attended performances
IRC Slapper Chord
Number of
hops to have
the best
reachability
a fixed knowed value
whatever the number of
devices
A maximal
value de-
pending on
the identi-
fiers space
size
Impact of an
high branch-
ing factor
negative im-
pact (m=5)
Positive im-
pact
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